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I. INTRODUCTION
Commodity-product manufacturers fix prices everyday. Indeed, many
companies prefer fixing prices and getting caught to obeying the antitrust laws.'
Consumers who purchase price-fixed products or products into which price-
fixed ingredients are incorporated drive price-fixing schemes and allow them to
thrive. After all, without consumers' end-use purchases, no ultimate demand
exists for price fixers' products, and price-fixing schemes become meaningless.
In this manner, price fixers pass their illegal price increases down the distribu-
tion chain to consumers who absorb most, if not all, of their illegal overcharges
when price fixing occurs.2
While federal law allows only price-fixed products' direct purchasers -
not consumers - to pursue damage claims 4 (namely, Clayton Act claims for
Sherman Act violations), consumers (also known as "indirect purchasers"5) can
I See Daniel R. Karon, Price Fixing, Market Allocation and Bid Rigging Conspiracies: How
to Counsel Your Clients to Detect Violations and Inform You of Potential Claims, 25 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 241, 255 (2001) ("Some would... argue that it is simply good business to fix
prices, divide markets, and rig bids.") (emphasis added); Daniel R. Karon, Collusion Central:
Helping your clients deal with price fixers, 11 BUS. L. TODAY 9, 12 (2002) ("[S]ome sellers seem
to believe they will be better off in the long run (that is, make more money) fixing prices and
getting caught than never fixing prices in the first place.").
2 See, e.g., Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 204 (1990) (Observing that where
"suppliers overcharge[d] a public utility for natural gas . . . the utility passe[d] on the overcharge
to its customers."); In re Methionine Antitrust Litig., 204 F.R.D. 161, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (Court
denied class certification for multi-level indirect purchaser class, explaining the "proof will differ
for each class member as to whether that member was overcharged ... and if so, whether and to
what extent the member passed on the overcharge and, if the overcharge was fully passed on, how
the class member was otherwise injured by the conspiracy."); Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646
N.W.2d 440, 450 (Iowa 2002) (Suggesting that "direct purchasers damaged by [antitrust] over-
charge[s] . .. simply pass on the increased cost to consumers."); N.M. STAT. 57-1-3(C) (2004)
(Explaining that defense to antitrust claim exists when defendant "prove[s] that the plaintiff pur-
chaser or seller in the chain of manufacture, production, or distribution who paid any overcharge
or received any underpayment, passed on all or any part of such overcharge or underpayment to
another purchaser or seller in such chain.").
3 A "direct purchaser" is a person or entity that purchases a price-fixed product directly from
the price fixer.
4 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) ("[W]e conclude that the legislative
purpose in creating a group of 'private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws under §4...
is better served by holding direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid
by them ... ").
5 While "indirect purchasers" also include mid-level purchasers, these mid-level purchasers
frequently pass their illegal overcharges down the distribution chain until they arrive at the ulti-
mate indirect purchaser - consumers purchasing for end use. See also supra note 2.
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recover for price-fixing violations under certain states' antitrust or consumer-
fraud statutes. Yet despite a trend toward permitting recovery to consumers
under state consumer-protection laws, some state courts have refused to em-
brace these theories, thus largely denying recovery to price fixers' ultimate vic-
tims.
6
But an effective remedy exists in states not explicitly embracing anti-
trust or consumer-fraud claims against price fixers. Unjust enrichment is an
underutilized and often overlooked theory that consumers can invoke when vic-
timized by price fixers. When unjust enrichment is pleaded, price fixers in-
variably argue its inapplicability, believing it requires a "direct relationship"
between the parties, or that the consumers pay a "direct benefit" to the price
fixers. 7 And although debate rages as to whether, in a consumer price-fixing
setting, unjust enrichment requires these "directness" elements, unjust enrich-
ment's applicability to consumer price-fixing claims has never been fully exam-
ined.
This article will demonstrate that neither a direct relationship nor direct
benefit is required to sustain an unjust-enrichment claim for price fixing and
will argue that unjust enrichment is an entirely suitable theory for consumers to
invoke. It will first describe why federal price-fixing claims are reserved for
price-fixed products' direct purchasers under federal antitrust law and how con-
sumers' price-fixing remedies exist in state courts under certain states' antitrust
laws.8 Next, it will explain unjust enrichment's historical application, antici-
pated suitability to consumer price-fixing claims, and nationwide similarity.9 It
will then describe price fixers' "directness" arguments and will argue that no
state's unjust-enrichment law requires these additional elements to sustain a
claim. 10 Finally, it will conclude that unjust enrichment is, and always has been,
a fitting theory of recovery, especially in states that resist applying their antitrust
or consumer-fraud laws to consumer price-fixing claims. 1'
6 See infra note 48.
7 See infra Part IV.
8 See infra Part II. Although, pursuant to the newly enacted Class Action Fairness Act, 28
U.S.C. §1332(d) (2005), federal subject-matter jurisdiction might exist over consumers' state-law
claims if styled as class-action claims, federal subject-matter jurisdiction's existence doesn't affect
the substantive, state-law analysis that a federal judge must conduct and that this article embraces.
9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra Part IV.
II See infra Part V.
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11. FEDERAL LAW PROTECTS DIRECT PURCHASERS AND PERMITS STATES TO
PROTECT INDIRECT PURCHASERS
A. Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and ARC America
The Sherman Act 12 prohibits agreements among competitors to restrain
trade 13 - including agreements to fix prices 14 and allocate markets 15 - and the
Clayton Act gives U.S. district courts jurisdiction to "prevent and restrain viola-
tions of [the Sherman Act].... 16 As originally drafted, the Clayton Act per-
mitted both direct and indirect purchasers to pursue Clayton Act claims for
Sherman Act violations, 17 but indirect purchasers' antitrust standing began to
transform in 1968, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp. 
18
Hanover Shoe involved a shoe manufacturer's claim that it had paid il-
legally high prices for shoe machinery.' 9 Hanover alleged a Clayton Act claim
against United for "monopoliz[ing] the shoe machinery industry in violation of
§2 of the Sherman Act.' 20 Because Hanover had passed its alleged antitrust
injury on to its customers, United Shoe argued that Hanover lacked antitrust
injury and hence antitrust standing:
United claims ... that Hanover suffered no legally cognizable
injury, contending that the illegal overcharge during the damage
12 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (2005).
13 Id. at § 1. ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.").
14 See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274 (1942) ("[T]here can be no doubt
that this is a price-fixing combination which is illegal per se under the Sherman Act.").
15 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) ("Certain agree-
ments, such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation, are thought so inherently anticom-
petitive that each is illegal [under the Sherman Act] per se without inquiry into the harm it has
actually caused.").
16 15 U.S.C. §4 (2005).
17 See, e.g., In re W. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The presence
of intermediaries does not bar recovery [under the Clayton Act]."); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[Tlhe passing-on doctrine is not here being used as a
defense to permit the defendants to escape liability, but rather as an attempt to award damages,
insofar as is possible, to those who ultimately paid higher prices as a result of the collusive pric-
ing .. "); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582-83 (8th Cir. 1945) ("Under
the Clayton Act the right is not confined to persons in privity with the wrongdoer, but is given to
anyone who has suffered injury to his business or property by reason of the wrongful acts.");
Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1943) ("The one
complaining need not sue the person to whom he has paid the illegal prices.").
18 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
19 Id. at 483-84.
20 Id. at 483.
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period was reflected in the price charged for shoes sold by
Hanover to its customers and that Hanover, if it had bought ma-
chines at lower prices, would have charged less and made no
more profit than it made by leasing.'
But the Supreme Court ruled that Hanover had suffered antitrust injury
and that United Shoe wasn't permitted to assert Hanover's overcharge pass-on
as a defense to Hanover's monopolization claim: "Our conclusion is that Hano-
ver proved injury and the amount of its damages for the purposes of its treble-
damage suit when it proved that United ... overcharged it during the damage
period and showed the amount of the overcharge; United was not entitled to
assert a passing-on defense. 22
Nine years later, the Court considered Hanover Shoe's opposite circum-
stances when it decided Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.23 In Illinois Brick, the
State of Illinois and other Illinois governmental entities sought recovery from
concrete-block manufacturers concerning a "combination and conspiracy to fix
the prices of concrete block in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act." , 4 Since the
State of Illinois and the other entities had purchased concrete blocks indirectly,
the only way the antitrust violation alleged could have injured them was if all or
part of the overcharge had been passed on by the masonry and general contrac-
tors to them, rather than being absorbed at the first two distribution levels. 5
To Illinois's disappointment, the Court held that, because it had decided
in Hanover Shoe that antitrust violators couldn't use a pass-on theory defen-
sively, it would apply its pass-on rule equally to indirect purchasers and pre-
clude them from arguing they had suffered antitrust injury caused by over-
charges passed on to them by direct purchasers:
First, we conclude that whatever rule is to be adopted regarding
pass-on in antitrust damages actions, it must apply equally to
plaintiffs and defendants. Because Hanover Shoe would bar pe-
titioners from using respondents' pass-on theory as a defense to a
treble-damages suit by the direct purchasers (the masonry con-
tractors), we are faced with the choice of overruling (or narrowly
limiting) Hanover Shoe or of applying it to bar respondents' at-
tempt to use this pass-on theory offensively. Second, we decline
to abandon the construction given §4 in Hanover Shoe - that the
overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of
21 Id. at 487-88.
22 Id. at 494.
23 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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manufacture or distribution, is the party "injured in his business
or property" within the meaning of the section .... 26
The Court provided three bases for holding that only direct purchasers
could pursue Clayton Act claims for Sherman Act violations. First, it believed
"allowing offensive but not defensive use of pass-on would create a serious risk
of multiple liability for defendants. 27 Next, it thought "the evidentiary com-
plexities and uncertainties involved in the defensive use of pass-on against a
direct purchaser [were] multiplied in the offensive use of pass-on by a plaintiff
several steps removed from the defendant in the chain of distribution. 2 8 And
finally, it assumed that "the antitrust laws [would] be more effectively enforced
by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers
rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to
sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by it."
29
But the Supreme Court's concerns proved unfounded in the years fol-
lowing Illinois Brick. Instead, courts have noted the "absence of cases in which
...court[s have been] faced with the impossible task of apportioning dam-
ages. 3° Multiple courts have likewise observed that "[clomplexity is not a for-
eign concept in the world of antitrust '31 and that "because a defendant guilty of
an antitrust violation would face paying damages to indirect purchasers under
state antitrust laws as well as paying any damages awarded to direct purchasers
under federal antitrust laws ... both direct and indirect purchasers ... have a
sufficient incentive to sue for violations....
26 Id. at 728-29 (footnote omitted).
27 Id. at 730.
28 Id. at 732.
29 Id. at 735.
30 Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2002). See also Bunker's Glass Co.
v. Pilkington PLC, 75 P.3d 99, 108 (Ariz. 2003) ('The risk of multiple liability for Defendants...
is not.., a problem that our trial courts are incompetent to handle. Indeed, most of the Illinois
Brick repealer statutes leave the solution to the double-recovery problem to the courts.").
31 Comes, 646 N.W.2d. at 451. See also Bunker's, 75 P.3d at 108 ("The complexity of proving
damages through multiple levels of sales is a daunting task, but one to which our courts are
equal."); Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., No. M2000-01850-COA-R9-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS
539, at *102 (July 31, 2003) (Explaining that courts considering the issue have not "found com-
plexity of the litigation a reason to prohibit indirect purchaser suits .... ); Hyde v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 473 S.E.2d 680, 687 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("[W]hen asked at oral argument whether 'chaos
reigned' in states which have allowed indirect purchaser suits, defendants were unable to cite a
single example.").
32 Hyde, 473 S.E.2d at 687. See also Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 47 P.3d 1119,
1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (noting both direct and indirect purchasers have "'sufficient incentive
to sue for [antitrust] violations.' (quoting Hyde, 473 S.E.2d at 687)"); Amanda Cohen, Surveying
the Microsoft Antitrust Universe, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 333, 351 n. 106 (2004) (Noting that,
with respect to indirect purchasers' actions against Microsoft for monopoly pricing, "consumers
have filed numerous state class actions and more than one hundred multidistrict class actions in
federal court."); Master Settlement Agreement relating to the Indirect Vitamin Purchaser Antitrust
[Vol. 108
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court expounded upon its Illinois Brick hold-
ing twelve years later when it decided California v. ARC America Corp.33 In
ARC America, the States of Alabama, Arizona, California, and Minnesota, all of
which had indirectly purchased cement and concrete, "alleged violations of their
respective state antitrust laws under which, as a matter of state law, indirect
purchasers arguably [were] allowed to recover for all overcharges passed on to
them by direct purchasers. 34 After all, by this time, "[t]he statutes of Alabama,
California, and Minnesota expressly allow[ed] indirect purchasers to sue, ...
[and t]he Arizona statute ... [while] generally follow[ing] the language of the
Clayton Act, [could] be interpreted as a matter of state law as authorizing indi-
rect purchasers to recover.1
35
The Court first explained that its Illinois Brick holding related solely to
federal, not state, antitrust law:
Under federal law, no indirect purchaser is entitled to sue for
damages for a Sherman Act violation, and there is no claim here
that state law could provide a remedy for the federal violation
that federal law forbids. Had these cases gone to trial and a
Sherman Act violation been proved, only direct purchasers
would have been entitled to damages for that violation, and
there is no suggestion by the parties that the same rule should
not apply to distributing that part of the fund that was meant to
settle the Sherman Act claims. The issue before us is whether
this rule limiting recoveries under the Sherman Act also pre-
vents indirect purchasers from recovering damages flowing
from violations of state law, despite express state statutory pro-
visions giving such purchasers a damages cause of action.36
Acknowledging that "[a]t the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act,
21 States had already adopted their own antitrust laws, 37 the Court instructed
that state indirect-purchaser statutes were "consistent with the broad purposes of
the federal antitrust laws: deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the
compensation of victims of that conduct. 38 The Court noted that "nothing in
Illinois Brick suggest[ed] that it would be contrary to congressional purposes for
Litigation, at Schedule G (as amended Jan. 22, 2001), which resolved multi-level indirect pur-
chasers' claims against worldwide vitamin manufacturers in twenty-one states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico for $225,250,000 (on file with author).
33 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
34 Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 98 n.3.
36 Id. at 100-01.
37 Id. at 101 n.4.
38 Id. at 102.
20051
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States to allow indirect purchasers to recover under their own antitrust laws, 39
and that its Illinois Brick decision construed only federal law:
When viewed properly, Illinois Brick was a decision construing
the federal antitrust laws, not a decision defining the interrela-
tionship between the federal and state antitrust laws. The con-
gressional purposes on which Illinois Brick was based provide
no support for a finding that state indirect purchaser statutes are
pre-empted by federal law.4°
The Court ultimately determined that "the Court of Appeals [had] erred
in holding that the state indirect purchaser statutes [were] pre-empted, '"41 and, in
doing so, concluded that indirect purchasers weren't proscribed from suing
price-fixing claims under state antitrust laws.
B. Consumer Remedies Under Certain States' Antitrust or Consumer-
Fraud Statutes
Following Illinois Brick, and as ultimately endorsed by ARC America,
several states amended their antitrust statutes to explicitly provide claims for
indirect purchasers, either privately or through state attorneys general as parens
patriae. Several other states' courts have also more recently interpreted their
states' antitrust 43 or consumer-fraud statutes 44 to permit either private or parens
39 Id. at 103.
40 Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 101.
42 ALA. CODE §6-5-60 (2005); ALASKA STAT. §45.50.577 (2004) (authorizing attorney gen-
eral action as parens patriae); ARK. CODE ANN. §4-75-315 (2005) (authorizing attorney general
action as parens patriae); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §6-4-
111 (2004) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); D.C. CODE ANN. §28-4509
(2005); HAW. REV. STAT. §480-13 (2004); IDAHO CODE §48-113 (2005); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 10/7 (2005) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§50-161 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104 (2005); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 11-
209 (West 2005) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§445.778 (2005); MINN. STAT. §325D.57 (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. §75-21-9 (2005); NEB.
REV. STAT. §59-821 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. §598A.160 (2005) (authorizing attorney general
action as parens patriae); N.M. STAT. ANN. §57-1-3 (2004) (authorizing attorney general action
as parens patriae); N.Y. GEN. BUS. §340 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §51-08.1-08 (2005); OR.
REV. STAT. §646.780 (2005) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §6-36-12 (2005) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §37-1-33 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 9, §2465 (2005); W. VA. CODE R. §§142-9-1, 142-9-
2 (2005); WIS. STAT. §133.18 (2005).
43 See Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., No. E2003-00527-SC-S09-CV, 2005
Tenn. LEXIS 668, at *9 (Aug. 25, 2005) (Under Tennessee's antitrust act, "an indirect purchaser
may recover from the antitrust violator the amount of the overcharge that the direct purchaser
passed on to the indirect purchaser."); Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 75 P.3d 99, 110
(Ariz. 2003) (Finding the Arizona Antitrust Act applicable to indirect purchasers' price-fixing
[Vol. 108
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patriae consumer price-fixing claims. After all, as the Tennessee Appellate
Court recently explained in Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp.,45 nothing in Hanover
Shoe or Illinois Brick precludes states from providing consumers remedies for
price-fixing violations:
It is one thing to consider the congressional policies identified in
Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining what sort of recov-
ery federal antitrust law authorizes; it is something altogether
different, and in our view inappropriate, to consider them as de-
fining what federal law allows States to do under their own anti-
trust law.... But nothing in Illinois Brick suggests that it would
be contrary to congressional purposes for States to allow indirect
purchasers to recover under their own antitrust laws.46
But while virtually all states, at least theoretically, provide consumers
47either antitrust or consumer-fraud remedies for price-fixing violations, some
state courts have resisted explicitly recognizing consumer price-fixing claims
claims, explaining that "[a]llowing the courts to attempt to achieve justice in the antitrust realm
comports with the longstanding policy of this state to protect consumers and deter anti-
competitive behavior."); Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2002) ("We
conclude [Iowa's] antitrust law contemplates all injured consumers are authorized to bring suit to
enforce our antitrust laws."); Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 473 S.E.2d 680, 688 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996) ("[W]e hold that indirect purchasers have standing under [the North Carolina Antitrust
Act].").
44 See WASH. REV. CODE §19.86.080 (2005) (authorizing attorney-general action as parens
patriae); Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 676 N.W.2d 29, 37 (Neb. 2004) (Nebraska's consumer-fraud
act "was intended to be an antitrust measure to protect Nebraska consumers from monopolies and
price-fixing conspiracies."); Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 817 A.2d 9, 18-20 (Vt. 2002) (explaining
that indirect purchasers can sue consumer-fraud claims for antitrust violations); Ciardi v. F. Hoff-
man-LaRoche. Ltd. 762 N.E.2d 303, 312, n.1 8 (Mass. 2002) (Massachusetts' consumer-fraud act
"allows indirect purchasers to bring a cause of action for anticompetitive conduct that would be
precluded under the Antitrust Act."); Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 110
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Ruling that consumers can sue under the Florida Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, explaining "we will not imply a repeal of a consumer's cause of action expressly
established by the legislature in the Florida DTPA."); Sickles v. Cabot Corp., No. CAM-L-6230-
03, slip op. at 5-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2004) (on file with author) (finding that New Jersey's
consumer-fraud and antitrust acts provide claims for indirect purchasers); Cement Masons Local
Union No. 699 v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 431-99, slip op. at 10-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2000)
(on file with author) (order denying motion to dismiss consumer-fraud claim on behalf of con-
sumer-indirect purchasers).
45 Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., No. M2000-1850-COA-R9-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539
(July 31, 2003).
46 Id. at *82.
47 See Daniel R. Karon, "Your Honor, Tear Down That Illinois Brick Wall!" The National
Movement Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1351, 1401 (2004) (Arguing that "thirty-nine (and arguably as many as forty-
four) states grant indirect purchasers standing, either on their own or through their attorneys gen-
eral as parens patriae, to pursue price fixing claims.").
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brought under their states' antitrust or consumer-fraud statutes.48 And in certain
states, where only parens-patriae authority exists for bringing antitrust or con-
sumer-fraud, price-fixing claims, state attorneys general oftentimes lack the
resources to bring these actions, meaning many consumers' claims remain un-
pursued.49
48 See Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 834 N.E.2d 791, 798 (Ohio 2005) ("[C]onsistent with long-
standing Ohio jurisprudence, which has followed federal law in antitrust matters, we adopt and
follow Illinois Brick's direct-purchaser requirement and hold that an indirect purchaser of goods
may not assert a[n antitrust a]ct claim for alleged violations of Ohio antitrust law."); Vacco v.
Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d 1048, 1058 (Conn. 2002) ("We conclude that allowing only those
consumers who purchase directly from the antitrust defendant to bring suit under our state anti-
trust law ensures that the Antitrust Act remains harmonious with federal antitrust statutes."); Min-
uteman, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 795 A.2d 833, 838 (N.H. 2002) ("[Wle conclude ... that it is
sound to limit antitrust lawsuits to direct purchasers."); Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d
503, 507 (Tex. 1995) ("[W]e hold that the conduct alleged by the intervenors is not actionable
under the DTPA."); Berghausen v. Microsoft Corp., 765 N.E.2d 592, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
("[Wie hold the Indiana Act does not provide a cause of action to indirect purchasers who allege
they were harmed by an antitrust injury .. "); Major v. Microsoft Corp., 60 P.3d 511, 514 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2002) ("[Tlhis Court concluded - and again concludes - that the Illinois Brick direct
purchaser rule is controlling law in Oklahoma."); Arnold v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2000-CA-
002144-MR, 2001 WL 1835377, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2001) ("[W]e agree with the trial
court that indirect purchasers . . . are not entitled to bring an action for anti-trust violations under
[the Kentucky Antitrust Act]."); Duvall v. Silvers, Asher, Sher & McLaren, M.D.'s Neurology,
P.C., 998 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("Batchu was the party directly harmed by the
defendants' alleged actions; hence, the harms that Duvall described were too remote to support his
claim of antitrust violations."); Island Mortgages of New Jersey v. 3M, No. PAS-L-2997-03, 2004
N.J. Super. LEXIS 382, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., June 30, 2004) ("This court finds that
plaintiffs' attempt to bring suit under the Consumer Fraud Act is in direct conflict with the well-
founded policies interpreting federal and New Jersey antitrust law."); Wilson v. General Motors
Corp., No. L-1287-03, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with author) (order dis-
missing plaintiffs consumer-fraud claim for indirect-purchaser-price-fixing injury); Kieffer v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., No. BER-L-365-99-EM, 1999 WL 1567726 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1999) (on
file with author) (letter opinion holding indirect purchasers lack standing under New Jersey's
antitrust and consumer-fraud acts).
49 For instance, in a price-fixing case involving sorbates (a food additive), indirect purchasers
reached private settlements in fourteen states and the District of Columbia. See Multi-state Sor-
bates Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement of $7.8 Million, Settlement Hear-
ing and Right to Appear, at 4 (Apr. 20, 2001) (on file with author); California [Sorbates] Notice of
Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlements, at 3 (Sept. 14, 2001) (on file with author);
Tennessee [Sorbates] Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement of $1.45 Mil-
lion, Settlement Hearing and Right to Appear, at 4 (Oct. 19, 2001) (on file with author); The
Business Journal Serving Metropolitan Kansas City, Aug. 3, 2001, vol.19, no.47, p.7 (on file with
author); Remarks of Ray L. Himes, Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the New York Attorney
General (Nov. 5, 2003), in Protecting - and Advancing Consumer Interests When the Antitrust
"Reform" Engine Kicks Into Gear, at 10-11, available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.orglrecent2/282.pdf. But afterwards, only six state attorneys general
filed parens patriae cases on behalf of their states' consumers, thus leaving remedies for thirty
states' indirect purchasers unpursued. Id. See Idaho v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., No. CV-OC-
0300114D (Ada Co., Id. 4 th Jud. Dist. Ct.) (on file with author); Illinois v. Daicel Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., No. 02 CH 19575 (Cook Co., 11. Cir. Ct.); Nevada v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., No. 02-CV-
6798 (Washoe Co., Nev. Dist. Ct.) (on file with author); New York v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd.,
No. 403878/2002 (N.Y. Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (on file with author); Ohio v. Daicel Chem. Indus.,
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In these circumstances, unjust enrichment becomes an entirely viable,
yet often underutilized, theory for pursuing consumer price-fixing claims. After
all, while ARC America considered consumers' ability to invoke state statutory
remedies (rather than the Sherman Act), it never purported nor intended to pro-
scribe consumers from invoking state common-law remedies when victimized
by price fixing. To this end, the Court explained that while "Congress intended
the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies...
on several prior occasions, the Court ... [had] recognized that the federal anti-
trust laws [did] not pre-empt state law, ' 50 without regard to whether the con-
templated state law was common law or statutory. In this manner, the ARC
America Court's holding didn't limit consumers to price-fixing claims solely
under state-antitrust statutes (if appropriately drafted); rather, it also endorsed
consumer price-fixing claims under state consumer-fraud statutes 5' and state
common-law remedies - like unjust enrichment.
III. UNJUST ENRICHMENT' S ESSENCE AND UNIFORMITY
A. Unjust Enrichment's History
"Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual theory or is a contract im-
plied-in-law in which a court may impose a contractual obligation where one
does not exist., 52 "Such contracts are not based upon the intention of the parties
but are obligations created by law and are 'founded on the principle that a party
receiving a benefit desired by him [or her], under the circumstances rendering it
Ltd., No. 02CVHIO-12064 (Franklin Co., Ohio Ct. C.P.) (on file with author); Utah v. Daicel
Chem. Indus., Ltd., No. 02091093 (Salt Lake Co., Utah 3 rd Jud. Dist. Ct.) (on file with author).
See also N.Y. AG sues food preservative manufacturers, THE BUSINESS REVIEW, Oct. 4, 2002.
But see Freeman Indus. LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., No. E2003-00527-SC-S09-CV, 2005 Tenn.
LEXIS 668, at *9 (Aug. 25, 2005) (where private plaintiff sought class certification in Tennessee
state court for consumers in the remaining thirty-five states where neither state attorneys general
nor consumers had pursued indirect-purchaser price-fixing claims).
50 California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989).
51 See supra note 44.
52 Whitehaven Cmty. Baptist Church v. Holloway, 973 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tenn. 1998). See
also, e.g., In re First Cent. Fin. Corp, 377 F.3d 209, 213 (2d Cir. 2004) ("'A quasi or constructive
contract ... is an obligation which the law creates, in the absence of any agreement .... '") (em-
phasis in original) (citing Miller v. Schloss, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (N.Y. 1916)); Midcoast Aviation,
Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 907 F.2d 732, 737 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[Q]uasi-contract mandates the
imposition of an obligation upon the benefit receiver to avoid the unjust enrichment."); Suburban
Transfer Serv., Inc. v. Beech Holdings, Inc., 716 F.2d 220, 226 (3rd Cir. 1983) ("Quasi-
contractual obligations are imposed by the law for the purpose of bringing about justice."); Dagen
v. CFC Group Holdings, Ltd., No. 00 Civ. 5682, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1225, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 2003) ("[Q]uasi-contractual relief, such as unjust enrichment, is [generally] not permitted
when an express agreement exists that governs the dispute between the parties ... ").
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inequitable to retain it without making compensation, must do So.' ' 5 3 Unjust
enrichment developed because basic justice suggested that people shouldn't
profit from others' misfortunes and "that no one [should] be made richer
through another's IOSS. ' ' 54  Indeed, dating back to early common law, courts
oftentimes invoked the maxim, "'commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere de-
bet,, 55 or "[n]o person ought to have advantage from his own wrong.,
56
At its essence, unjust-enrichment law strives to return improperly or
mistakenly taken wealth or possessions, 57 and unjust-enrichment actions typi-
cally require wrongdoers to return their ill-gotten gains to their victims. 58 To
achieve this purpose, recovery for unjust enrichment is normally measured by
the defendant's gain rather than the plaintiffs loss 59 - a restitutionary remedy
known as "disgorgement.
60
53 B&L Corp. v. Thomas & Thorngren, Inc., No. M2002-02355-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 94, at *71 (Feb. 10, 2004) (quoting Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154
(Tenn. 1966)).
54 JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (1951).
55 State ex rel. B.M.S. v. H.J., 65 P.3d 639, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
56 Id. at n.2. See also Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410, 411 (E.D. Va. 1962)
(acknowledging "the ancient common law doctrine that no [person] shall be allowed to profit by
his own wrong").
57 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrUTION § 1 (1937) ("A person who has been unjustly enriched at
the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other."). See also People v. One 1960
Ford, 228 Cal. App. 2d 571, 575 (1964) ("Where a constructive trust is therefore imposed on a
person to prevent his unjust enrichment, the purpose and result is to restore to the one person the
property of which he has been unjustly deprived and to take from the other the property which
would otherwise unjustly enrich him.").
58 See, e.g., Trieweiler v. Sears, 689 N.W.2d 807, 834 (Neb. 2004) ("Unjust enrichment re-
quires restitution .... which measures the remedy by the gain obtained by the defendant, and
seeks disgorgement of that gain"); State ex rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 153
(Iowa 2001) ("Restitution measures the remedy by the gain obtained by the defendant, and seeks
disgorgement of that gain.").
59 See, e.g., Guyana Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Melbourne Int'l Comm'rs, 329 F.3d 1241, 1249 (1 th
Cir. 2003) ("Restitution measures a plaintiffs recovery according to the defendant's, rather than
the plaintiffs, rightful position."); Alternatives Unlimited, Inc. v. New Baltimore City Bd. of
School Comm'rs, 843 A.2d 252, 293 (Md. Ct. App. 2004) ("The classic measurement of unjust
enrichment damages is the gain to the defendant, not the loss by the plaintiff." (quotation marks
omitted)); Candace S. Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 AM. U.L.
REV. 547, 557 (1986) ("[T]he reasonable market value of plaintiff's services can be viewed as the
correct remedy in most quantum meruit cases, even in many cases in unjust enrichment because
reasonable value can be viewed as the defendant's gain in certain situations."); 1 George E.
Palmer, LAW OF RESTITUTION §2.10 (1978) ("[T]he gain to the defendant need [not] be equated to
the loss to the plaintiff, nor indeed [need] there ... be any loss to the plaintiff except in the sense
that a legally protected interest has been invaded.").
60 See, e.g., In re Hailer, 839 A.2d 18, 21 (N.H. 2003) ("Restitution is an equitable remedy
typically applied to contracts implied in law to disgorge the benefit of unjust enrichment."); Mon-
tage Group, Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Computer Sys., 889 So. 2d 180, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
("Athle-Tech argues that the $8.9 million award for unjust enrichment is fully justified by the
disgorgement theory of damages. We agree with Athle-Tech that the application of the remedy of
[Vol. 108
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Eighteenth-century English common law spawned plaintiffs' ability to
claim defendants' gains rather than their own losses. Perhaps the earliest and
best-known case to invoke disgorgement was Moses v. Macferlan.61 In this
case, Macferlan promised Moses that if Moses endorsed certain promissory
notes over to him Macferlan would never enforce Moses' liability on the en-
62dorsements. 2 But after Moses endorsed over the notes, Macferlan sued him,
thereby breaching their agreement.63 The court in which Macferlan sued Moses
wasn't interested in the parties' contract, and it ordered Moses to pay Macfer-
lan.64
Moses then brought an entirely new action against Macferlan for his
65money's repayment. The question presented was, just as tort victims could
waive their tort claims and bring actions for money had and received - an equi-
table remedy - whether breach of contract victims could do likewise; namely,
pursue a restitutionary rather than compensatory action.66 Lord Mansfield ex-
plained that breach of contract victims could and, in doing so, articulated dis-
gorgement's fundamental essence:
This kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which
ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore
much encouraged. It lies . . . for money paid by mistake; or
upon a consideration[,] which happens to fail; or for money got
through imposition, (express, or implied;) [sic] or extortion; or
oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiffs situa-
tion, contrary to laws made for the protection of persons under
those circumstances. In one word, the gist of this kind of action
is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is
obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money.67
Given its compelling lessons, Moses v. Macferlan has since become viewed as
the seminal unjust-enrichment case providing that a defendant may be required
68to disgorge its ill-gotten gains.
disgorgement was appropriate under the facts of this case."); County of Essex v. First Union Nat'l
Bank, 862 A.2d 1168, 1174 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) ("[Olnly full disgorgement satisfies
the principle of preventing unjust enrichment . .




65 Id. at 677.
66 Id. at 678.
67 Id. at 680-81.
68 See, e.g., Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937) ("[Equitable actions] to recover upon
rights equitable in nature to avoid unjust enrichment by the defendant at the expense of the plain-
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B. The Restatement of Restitution's Related Approach
Not surprisingly, the Restatement of Restitution embraces Lord Mans-
field's observations and instructs that "[a] person who has been unjustly en-
riched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other."
69
Accordingly, restitution (or disgorgement) is achieved when the victim "is re-
stored to the position he [or she] formerly occupied either by the return of some-
thing which he [or she] formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in
money. 7 °
Many cases cited in the Restatement and elsewhere involve privity be-
tween the parties, but neither the Restatement nor Moses compels a direct rela-
tionship or benefit between the parties to sustain an unjust-enrichment claim.
Moreover, the Restatement contemplates restitutionary recovery in circum-
stances where "benefit and loss do not coincide,"7 1 thus further suggesting that
disgorgement is justified in situations where unjust enrichment results from a
defendant's wrongful conduct without regard to the parties' relationship. And
because unjust enrichment is so strongly rooted in equity and fairness,72 plain-
tiffs frequently invoke it to accommodate wide-ranging factual scenarios, 7 and
it can be especially effective when used to advance our nation's long-standing
policy goal to protect competition by maintaining free and competitive market-
places. 74
tiff, and its control in every case by equitable principles, established by Lord Mansfield in Moses
v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005 (K.B. 17[610), have long been recognized in this Court."); Nacional
Financiera, S.A. v. Banco de Ponce, 120 N.Y.S.2d 373, 414 (1953) ("Although the action for
money had and received is of necessity flexible, no broader principles relating to its scope have
been stated than in Moses v. Macferlan .... the leading case in the development of the law of
quasi-contract.").
69 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
70 Id. at cmt. a.
71 Id. at cmt. e (emphasis in original).
72 See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1378, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The
equitable doctrine of restitution and unjust enrichment are powerful remedies of fairness."); Penn
Towne Builders, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 677, 681 (1984) ("A claim based upon unjust
enrichment is derived from notions of fairness .... ); Malonis v. Harrington, 816 N.E.2d 115, 120
(Mass. 2004) ("The underlying basis for this legal obligation is derived from principles of equity
and fairness, to prevent unjust enrichment of one party. . . at the expense of another .. "); People
v. Brockman, 574 N.E.2d 626, 635 (Ill. 1991) ("So valued are principles of fairness and the avoid-
ance of unjust enrichment that even if a person who might otherwise be immune has contributed
as a cause to the injury he should be liable in contribution. This is so even though he cannot be
directly liable to the plaintiff."); Richland County v. State, 180 N.W.2d 649, 655 (N.D. 1970)
("The doctrine of unjust enrichment is based upon fairness and justice.").
73 See infra Part IV.A.3.
74 See Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000)
("It is the policy of the United States ... to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
State regulation." (quotation marks omitted)); Crawford Transport Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d
934, 939 (6th Cir. 1964) ("The purpose of the Sherman Act is to preserve for industry free access
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C. Unjust-Enrichment Law's Uniformity Among All States
Although price fixers insist that unjust enrichment's elements vary from
state to state, all states' unjust-enrichment laws are nearly identical. 75 To state a
claim for unjust enrichment,76 a plaintiff must allege the following elements:
(1) He or she conferred a benefit upon the defendant, who had
knowledge of the benefit;
(2) The defendant accepted and retained the conferred benefit;
and
(3) Under the circumstances, it would be inequitable for the de-
fendant to retain the benefit without paying for it.
77
Courts nationwide also emphasize that "[t]he most significant require-
ment for a recovery on a quasi contract is that the enrichment to the defendant
to competitive markets and to prevent monopolies in restraint of trade."); Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.
v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (Explaining the "antitrust laws [are intended]
to encourage to the fullest extent practicable free and open competition in the marketplace[, and
that r]estraints on competition are not favored.").
75 See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D. 672, 697 n.40 (S.D. Fla.
2004) ("The standards for evaluating each of the various states classes' unjust enrichment claims
are virtually identical."); Singer v. AT&T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 692 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
("[P]revailing case law holds that at least two of Singer's state claims, breach of contract and
unjust enrichment, are universally recognized causes of action that are materially the same
throughout the United States."); McDonald v. BMW of N. Am., No. BER-L-2892-03, slip op. at
35 (Super. Ct. N.J., Law Div., Bergen Co. Aug. 27, 2004) (on file with author) ("The law for
unjust enrichment is similar throughout the United States. Although there may be native varia-
tions that spin the doctrine to advance local needs, it appears to be an almost universally equitable
dogma.").
76 Although courts sometimes refer to unjust enrichment as "quasi contract," these terms are
generally understood to be synonymous. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Comm. on Employee Benefits of
the Fed. Reserve Employee Benefits Sys., 357 F.3d 62, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Unjust enrichment.
.. rests on a contract implied in law, that is, on the principle of quasi-contract." (citation omitted));
United States v. Michigan, 851 F.2d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[A]n action for unjust enrichment
is based on a quasi-contract, which is synonymous with a 'contract implied in law."' (citation
omitted)); Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. Sheehan Pipeline Constr. Co., No. A1-04-09,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19945, at *4 (D.N.D. Sept. 30, 2004) ("A claim for quantum meruit is
essentially a claim for unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, or implied-in-law contract"); Paschall's,
Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1966) ("Actions brought upon theories of unjust en-
richment, quasi contract, contracts implied in law, and quantum meruit are essentially the same.");
Tewarson v. Simon, 750 N.E.2d 176, 187 n.5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) ("[U]njust enrichment is an
action in quasi-contract and is implied by law where there was no meeting of the minds, but it
would be unjust to allow one party to retain benefits which he or she was not entitled to under
contract without paying for those benefits."); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Atlas
Cement Co., 406 So. 2d 1184, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (noting "unjust enrichment
form[ed] the foundation of the implied or quasi-contract between" the parties).
77 See, e.g., infra note 79.
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be unjust. '78 And since all states' common laws grew from shared historical
roots (including universally accepted fairness concerns), it isn't surprising that
all states' unjust-enrichment laws contain virtually identical elements.79
78 Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tenn. 1966). See also Tooltrend, Inc. v.
CMT Utensili, SRL, 198 F.3d 802, 808 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("[M]ost significant requirement for a
recovery on a quasi contract is that the enrichment to the defendant be unjust." (citation omitted));
Thompson v. Glenmede Trust Co., No. 92-5233, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16248, at *29 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 1, 1996) ("[T]he most significant requirement for recovery on quasi contract, however, is
that the enrichment to the defendant must be unjust." (citation omitted)); Ostroff v. FDIC, No. 92-
0632T, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3608, at *15 (D.R.I. Feb. 4, 1994) (citing Paschall's, Inc. v. Doz-
ier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tenn. 1966), for proposition that "[t]he most significant requirement is
that the enrichment to the defendant be unjust"); Green Quarries, Inc. v. Raasch, 676 S.W.2d 261,
264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
79 See Alabama
"The essence of the theories of unjust enrichment or money had and received
is that a plaintiff can prove facts showing that defendant holds money which,
in equity and good conscience, belongs to plaintiff or holds money which was
improperly paid to defendant because of mistake or fraud."
Hancock-Hazlett General Constr. Co. v. Trane Co., 499 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Ala. 1986) (em-
phasis in original).
Alaska
[W]e set forth three essential elements for a claim of unjust enrichment sound-
ing in quasi-contract:
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and
(3) acceptance and retention by the defendant of such benefit under such cir-
cumstances that it would be inequitable for him to retain it without paying the
value thereof.
State v. Mitchell, 930 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Alaska 1997) (emphasis in original).
Arizona
"Recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment requires five elements: (1)
an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrich-
ment and the impoverishment; (4) absence of justification for the enrichment
and the impoverishment and (5) an absence of a remedy provided by law."
Sierra Vista v. Cochise Enters., 697 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
Arkansas
'To find unjust enrichment, a party must have received something of value, to
which he was not entitled and which he must restore. There must also be
some operative act, intent, or situation to make the enrichment unjust and
compensable."
Dews v. Halliburton Indus., Inc., 708 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Ark. 1986).
California
"[T]he elements for a claim of unjust enrichment: receipt of a benefit and un-
just retention of the benefit at the expense of another."
Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal. App. 4th 723, 726 (2000).
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To recover restitution in a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must demon-
strate (1) that a benefit was conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff, (2) that
the benefit was appreciated by the defendant, and (3) that the benefit was ac-
cepted by the defendant under such circumstances that it would be inequitable
for it to be retained without payment.
Dove Valley Bus. Park Assocs. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 945 P.2d 395, 403 (Colo. 1997)
(quotation marks omitted).
Connecticut
"The elements of unjust enrichment are well established. Plaintiffs seeking
recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were bene-
fited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefit,
and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment."
Ayotte Bros. Constr. Co. v. Finney, 680 A.2d 330, 332 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (quotation
marks omitted).
Delaware
"Unjust enrichment is defined as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of
another, or the retention of money or property of another against the funda-
mental principles of justice or equity and good conscience."
Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 539 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Del. 1988) (quotation
marks omitted).
Florida
The elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment are: 1) the plaintiff
conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge of the benefit, 2) the
defendant accepts and retains the conferred benefit, and 3) under the circum-
stances it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without
paying for it.
Duncan v. Kasim, Inc., 810 So. 2d 968, 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
Georgia
"Unjust enrichment applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal contract.
• ., but when the party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by
the party contending an unjust enrichment which the benefited party equitably
ought to return or compensate for."
Engram v. Engram, 463 S.E.2d 12, 15 (Ga. 1995) (quotation marks omitted).
Hawaii
It is a truism that [a] person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the
other possession of or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses
in action, . . . or in any way adds to the other's security or advantage. [Cita-
tion omitted] One who receives a benefit is of course enriched, and he would
be unjustly enriched if its retention would be unjust.
Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647, 654 (Haw. 1985).
Idaho
[I]n order to establish the prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff
must show that there was: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the
plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance
of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant
to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof.
20051
17
Karon: Undoing the Otherwise Perfect Crime-Applying Unjust Enrichment to
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
King v. Lang, 42 P.3d 698, 703 (Idaho 2002).
Illinois
"The theory of unjust enrichment is based on a contract implied in law. To
recover under this theory, plaintiffs must show that defendant voluntarily ac-
cepted a benefit which would be inequitable for him to retain without pay-
ment."
People ex rel. Hartigan v. E & E Hauling, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 165, 177 (I11. 1992).
Indiana
"To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must establish that a
measurable benefit has been conferred on the defendant under such circum-
stances that the defendant's retention of the benefit without payment would be
unjust."
Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 408 (Ind. 1991).
Iowa
Recovery based on unjust enrichment can be distilled into three basic ele-
ments of recovery.. .. They are: (1) defendant was enriched by the receipt of
a benefit; (2) the enrichment was at the expense of the plaintiff; and (3) it is
unjust to allow the defendant to retain the benefit under the circumstances.
State ex rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154-55 (Iowa 2001).
Kansas
The basic elements on a claim based on a theory of unjust enrichment are
threefold: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) the accep-
tance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as
to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment
of its value.
J.W. Thompson Co. v. Welles Products Corp., 758 P.2d 738,745 (Kan. 1988).
Kentucky
"A person is enriched if he has received a benefit .... A person is unjustly
enriched if the retention of the benefit would be unjust."
Bryan Bros. Packing Co. v. Garrard, 386 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (quotation
marks omitted).
Louisiana
[T]he five requirements for a showing of unjust enrichment or action de in
rem verso are: (1) there must be an enrichment; (2) there must be an impover-
ishment; (3) there must be a connection between the enrichment and the re-
sulting impoverishment; (4) there must be an absence of "justification" or
"cause" for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) there must be no
other remedy at law available to plaintiff.
Hartmann v. Bank of Louisiana, No. 95-C-3058, 1997 La. LEXIS 3262, at *34 (Oct. 31,
1997).
Maine
To establish a claim for unjust enrichment, three elements must be proved:
[One,] a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; [two,] an ap-
preciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and [three,] the ac-
ceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances
[Vol. 108
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as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without pay-
ment of its value.
Bowden v. Grindle, 651 A.2d 347, 350 (Me. 1994) (quotation marks omitted).
Maryland
This Court has defined unjust enrichment as constituting three elements:
1. A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
2. An appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and
3. The acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit
without the payment of its value.
Berry & Gould, P.A. v. Berry, 757 A.2d 108, 113 (Md. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
Massachusetts
[T]hree elements must be established in order that a plaintiff may establish a
claim based on unjust enrichment. These elements are: 1) A benefit con-
ferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 2) An appreciation or knowledge by
the defendant of the benefit; and 3) The acceptance or retention by the defen-
dant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value.
Dickens-Berry v. Greenery Rehabilitation & Skilled Nursing Ctr., No. 92-3189, 1993 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 57, at *10 n.6 (Oct. 29, 1993).
Michigan
"The essential elements of a quasi contractual obligation, upon which recov-
ery may be had, are the receipt of a benefit by a defendant from a plaintiff,
which benefit it is inequitable that the defendant retain."
Michigan Educ. Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 596 N.W.2d 142, 151 (Mich. 1999)
(quotation marks omitted).
Minnesota
"The elements of an unjust enrichment claim include: (1) a benefit conferred;
(2) the defendant's appreciation and knowing acceptance of the benefit; and
(3) the defendant's acceptance and retention of the benefit under such circum-
stances that it would be inequitable for him to retain it without paying for it."
Fimon v. Kenroc Drywall Supplies Inc., No. C7-02-1588, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 311, at
*11 (Mar. 18, 2003).
Mississippi
The elements of a quasi-contract are: 1) a benefit conferred upon the defen-
dant by the plaintiff, 2) appreciation by the defendant of the fact of such bene-
fit, 3) acceptance and retention by the defendant of the benefit, under circum-
stances such that it would be inequitable to retain the benefit without payment
of its value.
Milliken & Michaels, Inc. v. Fred Netterville Lumber Co., 676 So. 2d 266, 271 (Miss.
1996).
Missouri
Quantum meruit is a remedy for the enforcement of a quasi-contractual obli-
gation and is generally based on the principle of unjust enrichment. [Citation
omitted.] The essential elements of a quasi-contract or quantum meruit claim
are (1) benefit conferred by one party on another, (2) appreciation or recogni-
tion by the receiving party of the fact that what was conferred was a benefit,
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and (3) acceptance and retention of the benefit in circumstances that would
render that retention inequitable.
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Mid-West Elecs., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(quotation marks omitted).
Montana
[Unjust enrichment] is defined as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of
another, or the retention of money or property of another against the funda-
mental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is en-
riched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of
the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he
has and retains money or benefits[,] which in justice and equity belong to an-
other.
Lawrence v. Clepper, 865 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Mont. 1993).
Nebraska
A quasi contract is a contract implied in law and usually has its origin in the
principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another. [Citation omitted] Where benefits have been received
and retained under such circumstances that it would be inequitable and uncon-
scionable to permit the party receiving the benefits to avoid payment therefor,
the law requires the party receiving and retaining the benefits to pay the rea-
sonable value of them.
Bush v. Kramer, 173 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Neb. 1969).
Nevada
'This court has observed that the essential elements of unjust enrichment are a
benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff, appreciation by the defen-
dant of such benefit, and acceptance and retention by the defendant of such
benefit."
Topaz Mut. Co. v. Marsh, 839 P.2d 606, 613 (Nev. 1992) (quotation marks omitted).
New Hampshire
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is that one shall not be allowed to profit or
enrich himself at the expense of another contrary to equity. While it is said
that a defendant is liable if "equity and good conscience" requires, this does
not mean that a moral duty meets the demands of equity. There must be some
specific legal principal or situation which equity has established or recog-
nized, to bring a case within the scope of the doctrine.
Cohen v. Frank Developers, Inc., 389 A.2d 933, 937 (N.H. 1978) (quotation marks omit-
ted).
New Jersey
To establish unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show both that defendant re-
ceived a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be
unjust. [Citations omitted] The unjust enrichment doctrine requires that
plaintiff show that it expected remuneration from the defendant at the time it
performed or conferred a benefit on defendant and that the failure of remu-
neration enriched defendant beyond its contractual rights.
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"Unjust enrichment exists when one party knowingly benefits at another's ex-
pense and allowing that party to retain the benefit would be unjust."
Romero v. The Bank of the Southwest, 83 P.3d 288, 296 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).
New York
The essential inquiry in any action for unjust enrichment or restitution is
whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to re-
tain what is sought to be recovered. [Citations omitted] Such a claim is un-
doubtedly equitable and depends upon broad considerations of equity and jus-
tice. [Citation omitted] Generally, courts will look to see if a benefit has been
conferred on the defendant under mistake of fact or law, if the benefit still re-
mains with the defendant, if there has been otherwise a change of position by
the defendant, and whether the defendant's conduct was tortious or fraudulent.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. State, 285 N.E.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. 1972).
North Carolina
"In order to establish a claim for unjust enrichment, a party must have con-
ferred a benefit on the other party."
Booe v. Shadrick, 369 S.E.2d 554, 556 (N.C. 1988).
North Dakota
"The essential element in recovering under a theory of unjust enrichment is
the receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff which would be in-
equitable to retain without paying for its value."
Zuger v. N.D. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 494 N.W.2d 135, 138 (N.D. 1992).
Ohio
[T]his court [has] observed that liability in quasi-contract arises out of the ob-
ligation cast by law upon a person in receipt of benefits which he is not justly
entitled to retain .... The court of appeals in this case listed the elements of
quasi-contract as follows: (1) a benefit conferred by a plaintiff upon a defen-
dant; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) retention of the
benefit by the defendant under circumstances where it would be unjust to do
so without payment (unjust enrichment).
Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 465 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (Ohio 1984) (quotation marks
omitted).
Oklahoma
"[I]n order to recover on grounds of unjust enrichment, Plaintiffs must prove
not only that OXY is responsible for contaminating the property, but also that
the contamination will not be abated, and that [defendant] in fact has received
an economic benefit thereby."
N.C. Corff Partnership v. OXY USA, Inc., 929 P.2d 288, 295 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996).
Oregon
'Fo establish unjust enrichment, plaintiff must offer evidence that (1) plaintiff
conferred a benefit on defendant; (2) defendant was aware that it had received
a benefit; and (3) under the circumstances it would be unjust for defendant to
retain the benefit without paying for it."
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"The elements of unjust enrichment are benefits conferred on defendant by
plaintiff, appreciation of such benefits by defendant, and acceptance and re-
tention of such benefits under such circumstances that it would be inequitable
for defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value."
AmeriPro Search, Inc. v. Fleming Steel Co., 787 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (quo-
tation marks omitted).
Rhode Island
To recover under quasi-contract for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must prove
three elements. First, a benefit must be conferred upon the defendant by the
plaintiff. Second, there must be an appreciation by the defendant of such
benefit. Finally, there must be an acceptance of such benefit under such cir-
cumstances that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without
paying the value thereof.
R & B Elec. Co. v. Amco Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1351, 1355-56 (R.I. 1984).
South Carolina
This Court has recognized quantum meruit as an equitable doctrine to allow
recovery for unjust enrichment. [Citation omitted] Absent an express con-
tract, recovery under quantum meruit is based on quasi-contract, the elements
of which are: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2)
realization of that benefit by the defendant; and (3) retention by the defendant
of the benefit under conditions that make it unjust for him to retain it without
paying its value.
Columbia Wholesale Co. v. Scudder May N.V., 440 S.E.2d 129, 130 (S.C. 1994).
South Dakota
"In order to establish unjust enrichment, three elements must be proven: (1) a
benefit was received; (2) the recipient was cognizant of that benefit; and (3)
the retention of the benefit without reimbursement would unjustly enrich the
recipient."
Mack v. Mack, 613 N.W.2d 64, 69 (S.D. 2000).
Tennessee
"[T]he essential elements of quasi contract[are]: A benefit conferred upon the
defendant by the plaintiff, appreciation by the defendant of such benefit, and
acceptance of such benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequi-
table for him to retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof."
Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 155 (1966).
Texas
To recover under quantum meruit a claimant must prove that:
(1) valuable services were rendered or materials furnished;
(2) for the person sought to be charged;
(3) which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be
charged, used and enjoyed by him;
(4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be
charged that the plaintiff in performing such services was expecting to be paid
by the person sought to be charged.
Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990).
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In order to prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, three elements must be
met. [Citation omitted] First, there must be a benefit conferred on one person
by another. [Citation omitted] Second, the conferee must appreciate or have
knowledge of the benefit. [Citation omitted] Finally, there must be the accep-
tance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as
to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of
its value.
Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 12 P.3d 580, 582 (Utah 2000) (quotation marks
omitted).
Vermont
In order to prevail on a quasi-contract claim, the trial court instructed the jury
that plaintiff must prove that (1) a benefit was conferred on defendant; (2) de-
fendant accepted the benefit; and (3) defendant retained the benefit under such
circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant not to compensate
plaintiff for its value.
Center v. Mad River Corp., 561 A.2d 90, 93 (Vt. 1989).
Virginia
To establish a count for unjust enrichment a plaintiff must allege: (1) a bene-
fit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) knowledge on the part of the
defendant of the conferring of the benefit; and (3) acceptance or retention of
the benefit by the defendant in circumstances that render it inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its value.
Ozberkmen v. Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc., 29 Va. Cir. 18, 22-23 (1992) (quotation marks
omitted).
Washington
To establish unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) a
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's ap-
preciation or knowledge of the benefit, and (3) the defendant's acceptance or
retention of the benefit under circumstances that make it inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.
Keil v. Scholten, No. 48051-1-I, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 196, at *16-17 (Feb. 4, 2002).
West Virginia
"[Quantum meruit] requires as an element of recovery that the services at is-
sue were performed under such circumstances by the individual seeking re-
covery that he reasonably expected be paid for such services by the person
sought to be charged."
Copley v. Mingo County Bd. of Educ., 466 S.E.2d 139, 145-46 (W. Va. 1995).
Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, an action for unjust enrichment, or quasi contract, is based upon
proof of three elements: (I) a benefit conferred on the defendant by the plain-
tiff, (2) appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) ac-
ceptance or retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances
making it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit.
Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Wis. 1987).
Wvoming
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IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT'S APPLICATION TO CONSUMER PRICE-FIXING
CLAIMS
A. Directness Not Required
While price fixers insist that unjust enrichment requires "directness" be-
tween the parties, their directness analyses frequently vacillate between two
distinct concepts. Price fixers typically argue that unjust enrichment requires a
"direct relationship" - namely, privity - between the parties, yet oftentimes si-
multaneously argue that unjust enrichment also (or sometimes alternatively)
requires a plaintiff to confer a "direct benefit" upon them. But these separate
concepts can't be properly analyzed when woven together in the manner often-
times advanced by price fixers. Rather, they must be considered separately to
properly understand that "directness" has no application to consumer unjust-
enrichment claims in any respect.
1. Unjust Enrichment Doesn't Require Privity Between the Parties
Price fixers' argument that unjust enrichment requires a "direct relation-
ship" between the parties is really an argument that unjust enrichment requires
"privity." But no state's unjust-enrichment law requires this additional ele-
ment.80 Rather, "[i]t is well established that want of privity between parties is
(1) Valuable services were rendered, or materials furnished,
(2) to the party to be charged,
(3) which services or materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by the
party, and
(4) under such circumstances[,] which reasonably notified the party to be
charged that the plaintiff, in rendering such services or furnishing such mate-
rials, expected to be paid by the party to be charged. Without such payment,
the party would be unjustly enriched.
Boyce v. Freeman, 39 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 2002).
80 See Montgomery v. Montgomery, 74 So. 2d 254, 257 (Ala. 1954) ("A suit for money had
and received is in the nature of an equitable action and is maintainable whenever one person has
money which ex aequo et bono belongs to another. No privity of contract is necessary between
the parties."); Krossa v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., 37 P.3d 411, 419 (Alaska 2001) ("When
parties to a contract dispute do not have a valid contract, plaintiffs may generally recover in quan-
tum meruit for services rendered."); Costanzo v. Stewart, 453 P.2d 526, 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)
(sustaining unjust-enrichment claim where privity between parties didn't exist); Fite v. Fite, 345
S.W.2d 362, 365 (Ark. 1961) ("This proposition is elementary. There need be no privily between
the parties, or any promise to pay, other than that which results or is implied from one man's
having another's money, which he has no right conscientiously to retain." (emphasis in original));
Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enter., Ltd., 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1010 (1970) ("[T]he function of a
quasi contract (despite the somewhat misleading concept of that second word) 'is to raise an obli-
gation in law where in fact the parties made no promise."' (citation omitted)); Salzman v.
Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Colo. 2000) ("[Unjust enrichment] does not require any promise
or privity between the parties."); P. Carpenter & Sons, Inc. v. Hanson, No. 92 0125511, 1993
Conn. Super. LEXIS 662, at *5-6 (Mar. 23 1993) ("Since the complaint does not allege the filing
[Vol. 108
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of a mechanic's lien, unjust enrichment or quantum meruit, but relies solely on breach of contract,
defendant Ness' motion for summary judgment is granted, as there is clearly no privity of contract
between the plaintiff and the movant."); Galvagna v. Marty Miller Constr., No. 96L-01-015, 1997
Del. Super. LEXIS 458, at *10 (Sept. 19, 1997) (quantum meruit claim sustained despite lack of
privity between the parties); First State Bank of Fort Meade v. Singletary, 169 So. 407, 408 (Fla.
1936) ("When the fact is proved that one has money received from another, if the recipient cannot
show a legal and equitable ground for retaining it, the law creates the privity and promise neces-
sary to sustain the action for money had and received."); Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 765,
770 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("An action for money had and received sounds in assumpsit and grows
out of privity of contract, express or implied; but absent an actual contractual relationship, the law
will imply a quasi contractual relationship to support the action."); Brown v. Judd, 17 Haw. 601,
603 (1906) ("The obligation, when there is no privity, is sometimes called a quasi contract but
strictly speaking is not a contract at all, for it may arise not only without the assent of the person
obligated but even against his express repudiation of any obligation."); Idaho Lumber, Inc. v.
Buck, 710 P.2d 647, 655 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) ("Where a materialman or subcontractor furnishes
labor and materials which benefit the property of a person with whom there is no privity of con-
tract, an action on quantum meruit may lie against the landowner to recover the reasonable value
of said labor and materials so furnished."); Sobel v. Franks, 633 N.E.2d 820, 829 (111. App. Ct.
1994) ("[Tlhere is no duty or privity requirement when bringing a claim for unjust enrichment.");
State v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 93 N.E. 213, 219 (Ind. 1910) ("In an action for money had and
received there need be no privity of contract proved."); Alpen v. Chapman, 179 N.W.2d 585, 588
(Iowa 1970) ("'There need be no privity of contract alleged or proved, other than such as arises
out of the fact that the defendant has received the plaintiff's money, which in equity and good
conscience he ought not to retain."'); Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified Waste Servs., Ltd., 910
P.2d 839, 847 (Kan. 1996) ("Our past cases establish that recovery under quasi-contract or unjust
enrichment is not prohibited simply because the subcontractor and the owner of the property are
not in privity. This conclusion is consistent with the theory of quasi-contract and unjust enrich-
ment, which does not depend on privity."); Guarantee Elec. Co. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 669 F.
Supp. 1371, 1380 n.9 (W.D. Ky. 1987) ("A lack of privity of contract is a prerequisite to the ini-
tiation of an action in quantum meruit."); Vandervoort v. Levy, 396 So.2d 480, 485 (La. Ct. App.
1981) ("As noted previously, the absence of a contract is one of the prerequisites to recovery in
unjust enrichment. Rather than serving to preclude Allain's recovery, the lack of privity is an
essential element of the actio de in rem verso."); Aladdin Elec. Assocs. v. Town of Old Orchard
Beach, 645 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Me. 1994) ("Lack of privity of contract and failure to perfect a lien
do not bar an action for unjust enrichment."); Plitt v. Greenberg, 219 A.2d 237, 241 (Md. 1966)
("Plitt ... does possess a colorable cause of action grounded on a theory of unjust enrichment or
restitution.... [Where] no express contract for debt existed between Plitt and Greenberg, the law
implies a debt .. "); Rabinowitz v. People's Nat'l Bank, 126 N.E. 289, 290 (Mass. 1920) (In an
action for money had and received, "[t]he right to recover does not depend upon privity of con-
tract, but on the obligation to restore that which the law implies should be returned, where one is
unjustly enriched at another's expense."); Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc.,
No. 207538, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2469, at *16 n.6 (Mar. 21, 2000) ("A quasi contract is not a
contractual obligation in the true sense because there is no agreement; it is an obligation that does
not require privity, and that will be imposed by law even though it is clear that no promise was
ever made or intended.") (quoting 42 CJS §4, Implied and Constructive Contracts (1991)); Ol-
son v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 150 n.4 (Minn. 2001) ("[A] quasi
contract does not require a promise or privity between the parties."); Delta Constr. Co. v. City of
Jackson, 198 So. 2d 592, 600 (Miss. 1967) (Where privity between the parties exists, "no recovery
can be had on an implied contract, or quasi contract, or upon quantum meruit .. "); Karpierz v.
Easley, 68 S.W.3d 565, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (In a suit for money had and received, "[i]t is not
necessary that an express promise to pay or privity of contract be pleaded or shown, for the law
implies both.") (quoting Brandkamp v. Chapin, 473 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971));
McDonald v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 65 P. 896, 906 (Mont. 1901) ("No privity of contract between the
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parties is necessary to sustain the action, except that which results from the possession by the
defendant of the money which in equity belongs to the plaintiff."); Siebler Heating & Air Condi-
tioning, Inc. v. Jenson, 326 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Neb. 1982) ("For a quasi-contract neither promise
nor privity, real or imagined, is necessary.") (quoting 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Con-
tracts §2 at 943-44 (1973)); Smith v. Hamilton, 265 P.2d 214, 216 (Nev. 1953) ("No further priv-
ity is required than that which results from the having by one person of another's money, which he
has no right conscientiously to keep, as in such cases the law implies a promise that he will pay it
over."); Knapp v. Hobbs, 50 N.H. 476, 478 (1871) ("[T]here need be no other privity of contract
in order to support this action than that which results from one man's receiving another's money
which he has no right conscientiously to retain."); Edwin J. Dobson, Jr., Inc. v. Rutgers, State
Univ., 384 A.2d 1121, 1157 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) ("Dobson, even on this claim, as-
serted no claim against Briscoe, not even on unjust enrichment which does not require privity of
contract." (quotation marks omitted)); Ontiveros Insulation Co. v. Sanchez, 3 P.3d 695, 698-99
(N.M. 2000) ("[Unjust enrichment] has evolved largely to provide relief where, in the absence of
privity, a party cannot claim relief in contract and instead must seek refuge in equity."); Manufac-
turers Hanover Transp. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (In an
unjust-enrichment claim, "[ilt does not matter whether the benefit is directly or indirectly con-
veyed."); Bailey v. Bishop, 67 S.E. 968, 969 (N.C. 1910) (privity not required to maintain quasi
contract claim); Gate City Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. IBM Corp., 213 N.W.2d 888, 893 (N.D. 1973)
("[Wiant or privity between parties is no obstacle to recovery under quasi contract .. "); Pioneer
Bank v. Flynn, No. CA79-04-0039, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 14532, at * 5 (Sept. 9, 1981) ("The
application of this doctrine [unjust enrichment] does not require privity between the parties.");
Berry v. Barbour, 279 P.2d 335, 338 (Okla. 1954) ("For a quasi contract neither promise nor piv-
ity, real or imagined, is necessary."); Rosenblum v. First State Bank, 581 P.2d 515, 518 (Or. 1978)
("[P]rivity of the contractual type need not exist between the parties.") (quoting Smith v. Rubel,
13 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1932)); McAvoy & McMichael, Ltd. v. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust
Co., 27 Pa. Super. 271, 277 (1905) ("No privity of contract is necessary to sustain this action [for
assumpsit], for the law, under these circumstances, implies a promise to pay[.]") (quoting 15 Am.
& English Encyclopedia. of Law Implied or Quasi Contracts 1096 (2d ed. 1900)); R&B Elec. Co.
v. Amco Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1351, 1355 (R.I. 1984) ("One of the theoretical bases underlying
the doctrine of quasi-contract states, that for quasi contract neither an actual promise nor privity is
necessary." (quotation marks omitted)); Madden v. Watts, 37 S.E. 209, 210 (S.C. 1900) ("[Tlhere
need be no privity between the parties, nor any promise to pay other than what arises and is im-
plied from the fact that the defendant has money in his hands belonging to the plaintiff that he has
no right conscientiously to retain."); Anderson v. Dunn, 4 N.W.2d 810, 812 (S.D. 1942) (Court
affirmed ruling that "no proof of privity between the parties in relation to ... money sought to be
recovered [is required] except that which arises by implication of law from the fact that the defen-
dant has money belonging to plaintiff which he has no right conscientiously to retain was re-
quired."); Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1966) ("It is well established
that want of privity between parties is no obstacle to recovery under quasi contract."); Miekow v.
Faykus, 297 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) ("For a quasi contract neither promise nor
privity, real or imagined, is necessary. In quasi contracts the obligation arises, not from consent
of the parties, as in the case of contracts, express or implied in fact, but from the law of natural
immutable justice and equity." (emphasis in original)); Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651, 655
(Utah 1974) ("[Quasi-contractual] liability exists from an implication of law that arises from the
facts and circumstances independent of agreement or presumed intention."); Beauregard v. Or-
leans Trust Co., 182 A. 182, 183-84 (Vt. 1936) ("[T]o maintain this action there need be no privity
between the parties nor any promise to pay, other than what arises and is implied from the fact
that the defendant has money in his hands belonging to the plaintiff that he has no right conscien-
tiously to retain.") (quoting State v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 10 A. 531, 533 (Vt. 1887)); E.E.
Lyons Constr. Co. v. TRM Dev. Corp., 25 Va. Cir. 352, 354 (1991) ("Virginia law appears to
follow the majority approach and will allow recovery on a quantum meruit claim by a subcontrac-
tor against an owner with whom he lacks contractual privity provided the essential elements of
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no obstacle to recover under quasi-contract, 8 1 and that when a plaintiff "bene-
fit[s] the property of a person with whom there is no privity of contract, an ac-
tion on quantum meruit may lie .... "82
When price fixers move to dismiss consumers' unjust-enrichment
claims on the basis that privity is required, they, not surprisingly, can't provide
authority for this proposition because none exists. And this authority's absence
stands to reason, since if the parties were in privity, consumers would bring con-
tractual, not quasi-contractual, claims in state court; or, as direct purchasers,
would have standing to sue Clayton Act claims for Sherman Act violations in
federal court. Requiring privity, then, would render unjust enrichment in con-
sumer price-fixing settings meaningless because contractual claims, or claims
derived from the parties' direct relationship (i.e., Clayton Act claims), would
entirely usurp unjust enrichment. Instead, when privity doesn't exist, unjust
enrichment - a quasi-contractual remedy - implies it and imposes a contractual
obligation. For unjust enrichment to work, privity can't exist.
2. Unjust Enrichment Doesn't Require a Plaintiff to Confer a
Benefit Directly Upon a Defendant
Just as privity isn't required between the parties, neither is a direct bene-
fit. Again, no state's unjust-enrichment law requires this additional element.
Price fixers' insistence that consumers directly benefit them is simply their con-
clusion, and no case law articulates just what price fixers mean by "direct bene-
fit." Rather, the case law price fixers frequently cite to support their direct
benefit argument merely suggests that the relationship between the parties need
be more direct than price fixers' customary relationship with consumers - their
schemes' intended victims. Price fixers' usual authority also generally involves
benefits that weren't considered unjust. And while this authority involves plain-
tiffs who were fewer steps from the defendants than consumers oftentimes are
from price fixers, a victim's proximity to his or her victimizer has never influ-
enced a court's determination of whether this victimizer's enrichment was un-
just.
Say, for instance, that consumers were four steps removed from the
price fixers in a particular conspiracy. What if the consumers had instead been
six or seven steps removed? Would a sufficiently direct benefit then have ex-
quasi contract are established."); Mill & Logging Supply Co. v. W. Tenino Lumber Co., 265 P.2d
807, 813 (Wash. 1954) ("Want of privity between parties is no obstacle to recovery under quasi-
contract."); Dunlap v. Hinkle, 317 S.E.2d 508, 512 n.2 (W.V. 1984) ("Recovery of damages based
upon the theories of quasi contract or unjust enrichment does not necessitate a finding of privity of
contract between the parties."); Puttkammer v. Minth, 266 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis. 1978) ("[T]his
court's decisions establish that privity is not necessary for recovery on a theory of unjust enrich-
ment."); Silver Dollar Motel v. Taylor Elec. Co., 761 P.2d 1006, 1007 (Wyo. 1988) ("The quan-
tum meruit/unjust enrichments theory is founded on implied contract . .
81 Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1966).
82 Id. at 155.
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isted at four steps? Or five? Likely so, according to price fixers. The point is
that no requirement exists demanding that consumers personally (or "directly")
put the unjustly retained benefits into price fixers' pockets. Rather, come day's
end, so long as consumers can prove that "a benefit [was] conferred upon the
defendant by the plaintiff, . ..defendant [appreciated] such benefit, and ac-
cept[ed it] under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for him [or her]
to retain [it] without payment of the value thereof,, 83 consumers' unjust-
enrichment claims will succeed. Just as privity can't exist for an unjust-
enrichment claim to lie, price fixers' direct-benefit requirement doesn't exist
either.
3. Multiple Courts' Agreement that Direct Benefit Isn't Required
Contrary to price fixers' conclusions concerning direct benefit, multiple
courts have expressed that a plaintiff needn't prove a direct benefit to succeed
on an unjust-enrichment claim. 84 For instance, in Metric Constructors, Inc. v.
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.,85 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, consider-
ing North Carolina law and the North Carolina Appellate Court's Effler v.
Pyles86 decision, first observed that unjust enrichment didn't require privity:
[T]he North Carolina Supreme Court has never held that a con-
tractor may not obtain equitable relief from a lender with whom
it had no contract. To the contrary, a contractor may be entitled
to equitable relief where the contractor completed a project but
the lender (with whom the contractor did not have a contract)
refused to pay.87
83 Id. at 155.
84 See, e.g., Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 668, *32 (Aug.
25, 2005) ("[T]o recover for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff need not establish that the defendant
received a direct benefit from the plaintiff. Rather, a plaintiff may recover for unjust enrichment
against a defendant who receives any benefit from the plaintiff if the defendant's retention of the
benefit would be unjust." (emphasis in original)); Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 797
P.2d 863, 867 (Idaho. 1990) (affirming summary judgment on unjust enrichment theory because
plaintiff had "conferred no direct or indirect benefit on [defendant]" (emphasis added)); Cummins
Cumberland, Inc. v. Dominion Bank of Middle Tenn., Inc., No. 01-A-01-9008-CH-00287, 1991
Tenn. App. LEXIS 11, at *6 (Feb. 15, 1991) (Court recognized that an indirect benefit, if proven,
was sufficient to sustain an unjust-enrichment claim but dismissed plaintiff's claim for lack of
factual proof: "Plaintiff next argues that the Bank received an indirect benefit ... [but] no evi-
dence is cited or found to indicate the amount of financial benefit .. " (emphasis added)).
85 72 Fed. Appx. 916 (4th Cir. 2003).
86 380 S.E.2d 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
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The court then explained that the North Carolina Supreme Court "sug-
gest[ed] a broader approach to unjust enrichment than [was] indicated by Ef-
fler's 'direct benefit' rule [and held that u]nder North Carolina law, it [was]
sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that it... conferred some benefit on the defen-
dant, without regard to the directness of the transaction.,
88
In Iconco v. Jensen Construction Co.,89 the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, considering Iowa's unjust-enrichment law, found "no requirement in the
cases that the plaintiff itself must have conferred the benefit sought to be recov-
ered from the defendant." 90 "Instead," according to the Iowa Supreme Court,
"benefits [could] be direct or indirect, and [could] involve benefits conferred by
third parties .... The critical inquiry [was] that the benefit received be at the
expense of the plaintiff."9'
In HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Hospital, Inc.,92 the
Illinois Supreme Court recognized that sometimes defendants are unjustly en-
riched indirectly, and when so, restitution is appropriate:
Many unjust-enrichment cases involve "situations in which the
benefit the plaintiff is seeking to recover proceeded directly from
him to the defendant." (4 G. Palmer, The Law of Restitution
§21.1, at 291 (1978).) The situation in this case, however, is dif-
ferent in that the plaintiff is seeking recovery of a benefit that
was transferred to the defendant by a third party. In such situa-
tions, courts have found that retention of the benefit would be
unjust where .. . the defendant procured the benefit from the
third party through some type of wrongful conduct.... See gen-
erally 4 G. Palmer, The Law of Restitution §§21.2, 21.4, 21.5, at
292-93, 298-99, 316-18 (1978). 93
Courts considering antitrust-based cases have also agreed that unjust en-
richment claims exist where the plaintiff doesn't pay a benefit directly to the
defendant. For instance, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation,94 K-Dur's manu-
facturer was alleged to have "entered into separate [illegal] agreements with
generic manufacturers . . . while those companies were pursuing FDA approval
88 Id. (emphasis added).
89 622 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1980).
90 Id. at 1302.
91 Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 155 (Iowa 2001) (emphasis added).
92 545 N.E.2d 672 (I11. 989).
93 Id. at 679 (emphasis added). Accord Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y v. Intercounty
Nat'l Title Ins. Co., No. 00 C 5658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7349, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2004);
Asch v. Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, 00 C 3290, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16747, at *22 (N.D. I11.
Sept. 26, 2003).
94 No. 01-1652, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19804 (D.N.J. Sept. 29,2004).
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of generic versions of K-Dur. ' 95 "Indirect Purchasers [i.e., consumers] ... as-
serted claims under the unjust enrichment laws of fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 96 With respect to the defendants' "claim that [the
indirect-purchaser] Plaintiffs' claims [were] deficient because unjust enrichment
claims require[d] that Plaintiffs confer a benefit on Defendants, 97 the district
court explained that the "Defendants' argument fail[ed] because a benefit con-
ferred need not mirror the actual loss of the plaintiff,"98 and that "[t]he critical
inquiry [was] whether the plaintiffs detriment and the defendant's benefit
[were] related to, andflow[ed] from, the challenged conduct." 99 The court ulti-
mately ruled that the main defendant's payments to its competitors "flow[ed]
from, and [were] related to, the anti-competitive conduct alleged by Plain-
tiffs," 1°° and that "Plaintiffs' purchase of K-Dur constituted a benefit conferred
on Defendant. . ., in the form of monetary payments."
10 1
In In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation,10 2 plaintiffs,
third-party payors (again, indirect purchasers), alleged that "Defendants [had]
entered into exclusive licensing agreements in restraint of trade in order to raise,
maintain, and stabilize the prices for the generic drugs Lorazepam and Cloraze-
pate .... 103 Ruling that plaintiffs' unjust-enrichment claim was valid, the dis-
trict court explained that "the benefit Plaintiffs claim[ed] that Defendants re-
ceived [was] easily cognizable,"' 4 and that plaintiffs had "pled that they [had]
absorbed millions of dollars in overcharges, which significantly increased [De-
fendant's] revenue and net earnings. ' '  Reasoning that "[a] plaintiff alleging
an unjust enrichment may be seeking to recover a benefit which he [or she] gave
directly to the Defendant, or one which was transferred to the Defendant by a
third party," 1°6 the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' unjust-
enrichment claim. 107
And in Cox v. Microsoft Corp.,10 8 plaintiffs "alleg[ed] that Microsoft
[had] engaged in purposeful, deceptive monopolistic business practices, includ-
95 Id. at *5.
96 Id. at *70.
97 Id. at *72.
98 Id. at *73.
99 Id. (emphasis added).
1oo Id.
101 Id.
102 295 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2003).
103 Id. at 33.
104 Id. at51.
105 Id.
106 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 681 N.E.2d 625, 633 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1997)).
107 Id.
108 778 N.Y.2d 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
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ing entering into secret agreements with computer manufacturers and distribu-
tors to inhibit competition... in its Windows software... result[ing] in artifi-
cially inflated prices for defendant's products. . . .,,0 New York's Appellate
Division ruled that the trial court had "erroneously dismissed plaintiffs' cause of
action for unjust enrichment, holding that, as indirect purchasers of Microsoft's
software products, plaintiffs [had] only indirectly bestowed a benefit upon Mi-
crosoft." 10 The appellate court believed that, "[c]ontrary to such reasoning,
plaintiffs' allegations that Microsoft's deceptive practices caused them to pay
artificially inflated prices for its products state[d] a cause of action for unjust
enrichment...."'
But In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation12 contains the most in-
depth discussion of "direct relationship" and "direct benefit" and their relation,
if any, to consumer unjust-enrichment claims. Along with antitrust claims,
Cardizem involved class-action, common-law, unjust-enrichment claims, this
time under various states' laws," 13 and concerned indirect purchasers' (consum-
ers') claims that defendants had conspired to prevent generic competition for
Cardizem.1 4 Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, arguing that
plaintiffs couldn't state common-law, unjust-enrichment claims because "they
[had] not and [could not] allege that they [had] bestowed a benefit directly on
Defendants; [and] they [had] not and [could not] allege that privity exist[ed]
between Plaintiffs and Defendants. . '.
Denying defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court first observed
that plaintiffs had properly pleaded their antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims:
The authority Defendants rely upon fails to support their posi-
tion that the success of Plaintiffs' common law unjust enrich-
ment claims necessarily depends upon the success of their statu-
tory claims. To the contrary, the courts often award equitable
109 Id. at 148.
11O Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
ill Id. See also Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Chem. Bank, 559 N.Y.2d 704, 708 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990) ("It does not matter whether the benefit is directly or indirectly conveyed.");
Investors Corp. of Vt. v. Bayer AG, No. S101 1-04OCnC, slip op. at 6 (Vt. Sup. Ct. June 3, 2005)
(on file with author) ("The fact that Investors Corporation and the putative class did not deal di-
rectly with the defendants is not relevant, as long as the elements for unjust enrichment are
pleaded."); New York v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., No. 403878/2002, slip op. at 26 (N.Y. Co.,
N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 24, 2004) (on file with author) (Denying motion to dismiss parens patriae
unjust enrichment claim for consumer price fixing damages based on defendants' "directness
argument," explaining that "the reach of equity is not so short. It suffices that defendant[s] re-
ceived benefits to which [they were] not entitled that were effectively conferred by plaintiff...
(quotation marks omitted)).
112 105 F. Supp. 2d 618 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
113 Id. at 668.
114 Id. at 623.
115 Id. at 669.
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remedies under common law claims for unjust enrichment in
circumstances where claims based upon contract or other state
law violations prove unsuccessful.
Rather than allegations and proof of the elements necessary for
its antitrust claims, Plaintiffs' common law claims for unjust en-
richment depend upon allegations and proof that the defendant
has unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff's detriment, and
that the defendant's retention of the benefit violates the funda-
mental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.116
Then, in an admittedly lengthy passage, the court carefully instructed
that defendants' purported privity (direct relationship) and directness (direct
benefit) requirements weren't necessary to sustain plaintiffs' unjust-enrichment
claim:
Likewise unpersuasive are Defendants' arguments that Plain-
tiff[s] must allege, as an essential element of their unjust enrich-
ment claims, facts showing that they directly conferred a benefit
on both HMRI and Andrx and facts showing that privity exists
between Plaintiffs and Defendants. The decisions Defendants
rely upon do not support the argument that either privity or a di-
rectly conferred benefit is an essential element of an unjust en-
richment claim under the state common laws at issue here.
As to the lack of privity, the decisions Defendants rely upon do
not support [their] position and at least one refutes, rather than
supports, the argument that privity between parties is required to
state a common law claim for unjust enrichment. See Paschall's
Inc., 407 S.W.2d at 154 (observing that "[it] is well established
that want of privity between parties is no obstacle to recovery").
See also Schiff v. Am. Ass'n of Retired Persons, 697 A.2d 1193,
1194 (D.C. App. 1997) ("[T]here can be no claim for unjust en-
richment when an express contract exists between the parties.").
Similarly, the authority Defendants[] rely upon fail[s] to support
their broad claim that Plaintiffs cannot state a common law claim
for unjust enrichment unless they allege facts showing that they
conferred a benefit directly upon each of the Defendants.
Rather, careful examination of the cited authority shows that the
courts dismiss such claims only where the plaintiffs fail to allege
facts showing that they have bestowed some sort of benefit upon
the defendant that the defendant ought not keep in equity and
116 Id. at 669-70 (quotation marks omitted).
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good conscience. See Rapaport v. United States Dep 't of Treas-
ury, 313 U.S. App. D.C., 59 F.3d 212, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(where the court observed that unjust enrichment cannot be
found where the plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant
has been enriched or why that enrichment is unjust). "The fun-
damental characteristic of unjust enrichment is 'that the defen-
dant has been unjustly enriched by receiving something ... that
properly belongs to the plaintiff[, thereby] forcing restoration to
the plaintiff."' Id. at 217 (quoting Dobbs, Law of Remedies
§4.1(2)). As the Rapaport Court observed, the typical elements
of a cause of action for unjust enrichment are: "(1) the plaintiff
conferred a benefit upon the defendant; (2) the defendant ac-
cepted and retained the benefit; and (3) it would be unjust for the
defendant not to pay the plaintiff the value of the benefit." Id.
Plaintiffs here have alleged that they conferred a benefit, in the
form of overpayments and increased profits, on Defendants, that
Defendants accepted that benefit and that it would be unjust un-
der the alleged circumstances for Defendants to retain that bene-
fit.
Contrary to Defendants' argument, there is no additional re-
quirement that a benefit flow solely from Plaintiffs to Defen-
dants. The courts do not define "benefit" as narrowly as Defen-
dants urge. As the Alabama Supreme Court observed,
"[w]henever one person adds to the other's advantage in any
form, whether by increasing his holdings or saving him from ex-
pense or loss, he has conferred a benefit upon the other." Ope-
lika Production Credit Ass'n, Inc. v. Lamb, 361 So.2d 95, 99
(1978) (citing Restatement, Restitution, § l(b); Sullivan, "The
Concept of Benefit in the Law of Quasi-Contract," 64 Geo.L.J. 1
(1975)). Whether or not the benefit is directly conferred on the
defendant is not the critical inquiry; rather, the plaintiff must
show that his detriment and the defendant's benefit are related
and flow from the challenged conduct. Id. Defendants' argu-
ments, that the connection between Plaintiffs alleged overpay-
ments for Cardizem CD and the benefits Defendants obtained as
a result of those overpayments is too tenuous, raise factual ques-
tions and refute Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs can prove no
set of facts allowing [Plaintiffs] to state a common law claim for
unjust enrichment.'
117 Id. at 670-7 1. See also Cox v. Microsoft Corp., 778 N.Y.2d 147, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
("[P]laintiffs' allegations that Microsoft's deceptive practices caused them to pay artificially in-
flated prices for its products state a cause of action for unjust enrichment.").
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Like privity, then, a direct benefit between consumers and price fixers
isn't required to maintain an unjust-enrichment claim. Instead, if consumers'
unjust payments ultimately make their way - however circuitously - to the price
fixers and these payments (or benefits) are known, accepted, and retained by the
price fixers, an unjust-enrichment claim will rightly exist.
B. Consumers' Benefit to Price Fixers is the Kind of Benefit Unjust En-
richment is Intended to Address
As demonstrated, although price fixers' direct relationship and direct
benefit arguments demand that consumers pay their money directly to the price
fixers, unjust enrichment doesn't require directness. Further, although price
fixers insist that the benefits consumers ordinarily confer upon them are too
remote, consumers are always squarely in price fixers' sites as their ultimate
victims, without whose end-use purchases price fixers' conspiracies are point-
less. According to all states' unjust-enrichment laws, consumers need only con-
fer a benefit upon price fixers, which is unjust for the price fixers to keep, and
no additional requirements exist requiring that this conferred benefit flow di-
rectly from consumers' hands into price fixers' wallets.
Despite the number of steps between consumers and price fixers, con-
sumers' benefit to price fixers is most plainly demonstrated by recognizing that
the consumer, end-use market drives price-fixing conspiracies, permits them to
thrive, and allows price fixers to profit from them. Consumers' overcharges
flow up the distribution chain into price fixers' hands, which is always the price
fixers' intention. Where privity doesn't exist (and, accordingly, a so-called di-
rect benefit doesn't exist either 18), unjust enrichment becomes the appropriate
theory to invoke. If unjust enrichment's elements are properly pleaded, no
maximum number of steps exists between consumers' unfair payment to price
fixers and price fixers' unfair receipt of it beyond which unjust enrichment
ceases to apply.
C. Certain States' Exhaustion of Remedies Doctrines Don't Affect Unjust
Enrichment's Application
Before a plaintiff can invoke unjust enrichment, certain states require
that a plaintiff "exhaust[] his [or her] remedies against the person with whom he
[or she has] ... contracted."'1 19 This requirement embraces two related assump-
118 Despite all arguments to the contrary, should a court nonetheless insist that a direct benefit
is required, "direct" in this sense doesn't only mean "next-step" from the seller. Rather, price
fixers can also be described as directly benefiting from consumers' overpayments in that these
overpayments are always conspiracies' "direct result," and consumers' overpayments create the
pool of money that ultimately makes its way "directly" into the price fixers' pockets.
119 Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tenn. 1966). See also, Whitehaven Cmty.
Baptist Church v. Holloway, 973 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tenn. 1998) (granting summary judgment and
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tions: (1) The person with whom plaintiff contracted is somehow culpable so
that a remedy exists against this person; and (2) if culpable, exercising this rem-
edy wouldn't be futile. 20 Both of these assumptions, though, encourage unjust
enrichment's continued application.
1. No Cognizable Remedies Exist Against Consumers' Contract-
ing Parties
In the traditional unjust-enrichment setting, the plaintiff contracts with
the ultimate wrongdoer (such as, for instance, where a landlord provides rental
space to a tenant who later refuses to pay the rent).' 21 Since this wrongdoer has
either disappeared or is otherwise uncollectible, the plaintiff has no choice but to
sue some third party (a "passive beneficiary," really 122) who benefited from, yet
never itself truly wronged, the plaintiff; although, a more appropriate defendant
than this passive beneficiary admittedly exists - namely, the contracting party.
But when price fixers victimize consumers, the consumers haven't con-
tracted with anyone who wronged them. Rather, price fixers victimize the con-
sumers' contracting parties - consumers' retail-product sellers - just like they
victimize the consumers, in that these retail-product sellers pass the price fixers'
overcharges down the distribution chain as designed. And unlike the traditional
unjust-enrichment setting, the third parties in this unjust-enrichment equation -
the price fixers (who are hardly passive beneficiaries here) - were the wrongdo-
ers. As a result, no cognizable remedy exists against consumers' contracting
parties since, as to consumers, their contracting parties did nothing wrong.
Rather - and particularly in states whose courts either don't permit statutory
claims for consumer price fixing 123 or haven't yet adjudicated the issue' 24 - un-
just enrichment becomes consumers' proper (and sometimes sole) remedy
against the price fixers.
dismissing plaintiffs unjust-enrichment claim because he didn't pursue his remedies against the
landowner with whom he had directly contracted).
120 See, e.g., Window Gallery of Knoxville v. Davis, No. 03A01-9906-CH-00225, 1999 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 775, at *10 (Nov. 24, 1999) (suggesting exhaustion of remedies satisfied if plaintiff
demonstrates that pursuing contracting party "would be futile").
121 See Haynes v. Dalton, 848 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (plaintiff provided office
space and overhead to defendant).
122 See, e.g., Puttkammer v. Minth, 266 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) ("Rather, this
case is representative of the usual case in which the [third party] has no part in initiating the work
and is merely a passive beneficiary of the work performed at the instance of [the contracting
party].")
123 See Karon, supra note 47.
124 Id. at 1376-92 (explaining that courts in Louisiana, South Carolina, Montana, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and Delaware have not yet adjudicated whether their broadly worded antitrust statutes per-
mit consumer price-fixing claims).
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2. Since No Cognizable Remedies Exist Against Consumers' Con-
tracting Parties, Suing Them Would be Futile
Since no cognizable remedies exist against consumers' contracting par-
ties - both because consumers' contracting parties are not culpable and because
"statutory claims are not cognizable under [certain] states['] antitrust or con-
sumer protection laws"1 25 - futility obviates consumers' requirement to exhaust
any alleged remedies against their contracting parties. Moreover, because con-
sumers' contracting parties are blameless, suing them wouldn't only be useless,
it would be reckless. Our nation's courts have long declared that "the law does
not require the doing of a useless thing,"1 26 and price fixers' typical authority
involves contracting parties against whom plaintiffs had cognizable, yet unpur-
sued, claims.1 27  Since oftentimes no cognizable remedy exists in consumer
price-fixing settings, pursuing consumers' retail-product sellers (for whatever)
would be futile, and consumers aren't required to do it.
3. Unjust Enrichment's Special Suitability in States That Haven't
Yet Embraced Consumer-Antitrust or Consumer-Fraud Theo-
ries of Recovery
In a concept related to "exhaustion of remedies," some courts believe
that a plaintiff can't invoke unjust enrichment if another adequate legal remedy
exists. 128 Although not a universally accepted principle, 129 these courts perceive
125 In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 260, 284 n.20 (D. Mass. 2004). See also supra
note 48.
126 United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 554 (10th Cir. 1995). Accord, Lambert v. Travelers
Fire Ins. Co., 274 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1960); Moates v. Barkley, 927 F. Supp. 597, 598-
99 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Webb v. Insur. Co. of N. Am., 581 F. Supp. 244, 249 (W.D. Tenn. 1984);
Commercial Carving Co. v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 191 F. Supp. 753, 760 (M.D.N.C.
1961); Labbe v. Pension Comm'n, 643 A.2d 1268, 1274 (Conn. 1994); State v. Beechum, 833
P.2d 988, 995 (Kan. 1992); Mobile v. Jackson, 474 So. 2d 644, 650 (Ala. 1985); Consumers
Power Co. v. Mich. Public Service Comm'n, 327 N.W.2d 875, 893 (Mich. 1982); American In-
dus. Leasing Co. v. Costello, 418 P.2d 881, 886 (Colo. 1966); Keel v. Indep. Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 99 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1957); Little Rock v. Southwest Builders, Inc., 276 S.W.2d 679, 685
(Ark. 1955); Williams v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co.., 157 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tenn. 1941);
Dolliver v. Elmer, 260 N.W. 85, 86 (Iowa. 1935); Kopeyka v. Woodstrom, 137 N.E. 137, 139 (Ill.
1922); Cree v. Sherfy, 37 N.E. 787, 788 (Ind. 1894).
127 See, e.g., Whitehaven Cmty. Baptist Church v. Holloway, 973 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tenn.
1998) (granting summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff s unjust-enrichment claim because he
didn't pursue his remedies against the landowner with whom he had directly contracted).
128 See, e.g., Delahunt v. Cytodyne Techs., 241 F. Supp. 2d 827, 841 (S.D. Ohio 2003) ("The
equitable claim of unjust enrichment fails when a legal remedy is available."); United States v.
Dieter, No. 01-1435, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6391, at *48 (D. Minn. Apr. 11, 2003) (ruling that
"no action for unjust enrichment lies" when "adequate legal remedy" exists); In re Managed Care
Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ("It is blackletter law that 'the theory of unjust
enrichment is equitable in nature and is, therefore, not available where there is an adequate legal
remedy."' (quotation marks omitted)); Lane Constr. Co. v. Brown & Root, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d
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unjust enrichment as a fall-back device that a plaintiff can invoke only after both
satisfying its elements and demonstrating that alternate legal theories don't ap-
ply. These courts refuse to consider unjust enrichment as an independently vi-
able claim "unless other claims [have been] considered, analyzed, and dis-
carded[, and contend that i]t does not spring into action until after all legal ave-
nues of relief [have] been found to be unavailing."1 30  Accordingly, in states
where consumer-antitrust or consumer-fraud claims don't legally exist 131 or
can't be practically pursued, 32 unjust enrichment is an especially appropriate
remedy to invoke.
V. CONCLUSION
Unjust enrichment requires neither a direct relationship (privity) be-
tween the parties, nor a plaintiff s direct benefit upon a defendant. Indeed, these
additional requirements misapprehend unjust enrichment's fundamental essence.
Rather, despite price fixers' efforts to introduce these new elements into unjust
enrichment, this age-old theory's purpose is, and always has been, to restore
equity, and unjust enrichment always has applied to situations like consumer
price-fixing claims. In this manner, unjust enrichment provides consumers -
particularly in states having arguably inapplicable antitrust and consumer-fraud
statutes - a powerful remedy against price fixers. After all, price fixers deliber-
ately victimize consumers, without whose end-use, consumer purchases their
price-fixing schemes would be meaningless.
But while price fixers remain perfectly content fixing prices and victim-
izing their end-use consumer market, they consistently strive to evade responsi-
bility for their crimes. It has long been said, though, that "[y]ou can delegate
707, 727 (E.D. Vir. 1998), rev'd in part on other grounds, 207 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 2000) ("It is a
well-settled principle under Virginia law that unjust enrichment claims arise only where there is
no express contract."); Inglish v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 928 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. 1996)
("As with claims of quantum meruit, unjust enrichment claims are predicated on the absence of an
express contract controlling the circumstances."); Cal. Medical Ass'n v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of
Cal., 94 Cal. App. 4th 151, 172 (2001) ("[Als a matter of law, a quasi-contract action for unjust
enrichment does not lie where, as here, express binding agreements exist and define the parties'
rights."). But see In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D. 672, 702-03 (S.D.
Fla. 2004) (certifying antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims under Florida law).
129 See, e.g., In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D. at 702-03 (certifying
antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims under Florida law); Ferrell v. Wyeth-Ayerst, Labs., Inc.,
No. C-1-01-447, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15127, at *19 (S.D. Ohio June 20, 2004) (Cases denying
unjust enrichment's applicability "if plaintiff has an 'adequate legal remedy' . . . are based on
written contracts, which provide the 'adequate legal remedy' to the aggrieved party.").
130 McDonald v. BMW of N. Am., No. BER-L-2892-03, slip op. at 38 (Super. Ct. N.J., Law
Div., Bergen Co. Aug. 27, 2004) (on file with author).
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authority, but not responsibility,"1 33 and courts should hold price fixers account-
able to their conspiracies' indisputably intended victims. By pursuing consumer
unjust-enrichment claims for price fixing, especially in states whose courts ha-
ven't yet fully embraced antitrust and consumer-fraud remedies, price-fixing
victims can truly help undo the otherwise perfect crime.
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